SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN THIRD CIRCUIT LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit cases of
interest to practitioners. In so doing, we hope to assist the legal
community in keeping abreast of some of the more interestingchanges in
significant areas of practice.
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ERISA-FIDuCIARY DuTY-AN INVESTMENT FIDUCIARY OF AN EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLAN CAN BE LIABLE FOR INVESTING
SOLELY IN THE STOCK OF THE CORPORATION-Moench v. Robert-

son, 62 F.3d 553 (3d Cir. 1995).
The plaintiff, Moench, was an employee of Statewide Bancorp
(Statewide) and participated in their Employee Stock Ownership
Plan (ESOP). 62 F.3d at 559. Statewide, a bank holding company,
maintained two subsidiaries, The First National Bank of Tom's
River (FNBTR) and The First National Bank of New Jersey/Salem
County. Id. at 557. The ESOP originated in 1986 and gave employees the opportunity to invest in the bank's common stock. Participation in the ESOP was voluntary, and employees who participated
had contributions deducted directly from their paychecks. Id. at
558. In addition, employees could cease contributions at any time.
Although the main purpose of the plan was to invest in the common stock of Statewide, the trustee responsible for the ESOP had
the authority to invest in other opportunities. Id. at 559. In the
summary plan documents, the ESOP established a Committee, the
defendant-appellees, which was responsible for operating and administering the plan. Id. at 557-58.
In the second half of 1989, Statewide began having financial
difficulties and its stock dropped approximately forty-seven percent. Id. at 557. Statewide's difficulties continued and, by May
1991, its stock was almost worthless. Statewide and its subsidiaries
received less than favorable reviews during this period from the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and they were cited for
poor management and inadequate controls. In May, 1991 the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation obtained control of FNBTR,
and Statewide filed a petition seeking relief from its creditors pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
The Committee presented no evidence indicating that they
had met to discuss the impact of Statewide's financial and regulatory situation on the ESOP. Id. at 559. In early 1991, the ESOP
stopped investing in Statewide stock and placed the assets in
money market accounts. Additionally, in mid-1990, outside investors filed a class action lawsuit against Statewide and some of its
directors, alleging security fraud. The ESOP did not participate in
this action and, thus, was not entitled to any part of the $3.2 million settlement.
Moench brought an action in federal court against the members of the Committee. Id. at 559. His motion for class certifica935
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tion was granted on December 20, 1993. Id. After further legal
maneuvering, Moench filed a five-count complaint, alleging: (1)
The Committee violated the fiduciary obligations conferred upon
it by the Employee Retirement Income Securities Act of 1974 (ERISA); (2) the members of the Committee were individually liable
for breaches as cofiduciaries; (3) the Committee failed to disclose
and misrepresented facts concerning Statewide's financial and regulatory condition that would have affected the employees' decision
to continue investing in the ESOP; (4) the Committee breached its
fiduciary responsibility to the ESOP, including the failure to file an
action for securities fraud against the company on behalf of the
ESOP; and (5) a securities fraud claim on behalf of the ESOP. Id.
at 559-60.
In a motion for partial summary judgment, Moench declared
that the Committee members were fiduciaries under ERISA. Id. at
560. The Committee members did not oppose the motion; therefore, it was admitted that these individuals were ERISA fiduciaries.
Id. The Committee also entered a cross-motion for summary judgment requesting dismissal of the case on the grounds that it did
not violate its fiduciary duties. Id. The district court granted both
motions and Moench appealed the dismissal of counts one, two,
and four. Id.
Judge Greenberg, delivering the circuit court opinion, reviewed the congressional purpose for enacting ERISA. Id. at 56061. The judge noted that the rise in the number of employee benefit plans prompted Congress to enact strategies that assured the
financial soundness of these plans. Id. at 560 The court also noted
that ERISA requires benefit plans to name fiduciaries, and those
fiduciaries must execute their responsibilities for the sole interest
of the plan, its beneficiaries, and participants. Id. at 560-61. The
Third Circuit noted that an ERISA plan can have more than one
fiduciary, each with responsibility for specific or joint functions. Id.
The court refuted the Committee members' contention that
they were not fiduciaries for the purpose of investing the assets. Id.
at 561-62. The judge stated that this position was contradictory to
the Committee members' summary judgment motion, in which
they admitted being fiduciaries but denied breaching their fiduciary duties. Id. at 561. The Third Circuit looked to the Committee's argument section of its summary judgment motion, where it
stated that because it complied with the ESOP's investment requirements, it could not have breached its fiduciary duty. Id. at
562.
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Upon determining that the Committee was a fiduciary with respect to investment of the assets, the court next analyzed the
proper standard to judge a fiduciary's actions under ERISA. Id. at
562-72. Judge Greenberg set forth three interrelated questions
that must be answered in order to make such a determination: (1)
Was the district court's ruling that the ESOP required the Committee to invest the plan assets solely in Statewide stock in error?; (2) If
the district court's decision was in error, did the nature of ESOPs
constrain the Committee's investment options?; and (3) If the plan
forced the Committee to invest exclusively in Statewide stock, did
the Committee breach its fiduciary duties under ERISA by not ignoring the provisions and thus diversifying the investments? Id. at
562.
The court began its analysis by examining the appropriate
standard of review for determining whether a fiduciary has
breached its duties under ERISA. Id. at 562-66. In reviewing the
case law, the panel performed a detailed analysis of the United
States Supreme Court's decision in, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch. Id. at 563-66 (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489
U.S. 101 (1989)). Judge Greenberg noted that Firestone condones
the use of trust law when determining the appropriate standard of
review for an ERISA fiduciary. Id. at 564 (citing Firestone,489 U.S.
at 111). The judge pointed out that the Firestone Court cited the
Restatement of Trusts and stated that where the trustee has discretion regarding the use of power, the judicial system shall only interfere when such discretion is abused. Id. The court explained, that
in situations where the trust agreement does not confer upon the
trustee the power to discern ambiguous provisions of the plan,
there is no deference to the trustee and the courts will exercise de
novo review. Id. (citing Firestone, 489 U.S. at 111-12).
The Third Circuit noted that many courts have interpreted
Firestone to confer the arbitrary and capricious standard of review
on cases where benefits were denied under ERISA. Id. at 565. The
court acknowledged that other cases applied a stricter standard for
determining whether the fiduciary breached his or her fiduciary
duty. Id.
The Third Circuit adopted a standard not incompatible with
the courts that distinguish Firestone, but at the same time emphasized the basic tenets of the Supreme Court decision. Id. Judge
Greenberg agreed that the arbitrary and capricious standard of review should not mechanically be applied to all ERISA claims. Id.
The court emphasized that on other hand, the Firestone decision
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authorizes the use of trust law to determine the appropriate standard for ERISA cases. Id. The panel further noted that the specific
ERISA provision allegedly violated in this action, §1104(a), uses
many terms and phrases frequently cited in trust law. Id. In the
present situation, the court determined that because the plan conferred upon the Committee the discretion to decipher its terms,
the arbitrary and capricious standard would apply; therefore, only
an unreasonable reading of the plan documents would be grounds
for court interference. Id. at 566.
In reviewing the reasonableness of the Committee's interpretation of the plans, the Third Circuit cited factors used by the
Eighth Circuit in deciding whether the interpretation of a plan is
reasonable, including: (1) Whether such interpretation is consistent with the plan's goals; (2) whether the interpretation renders
language in the plan either meaningless or inconsistent; (3)
whether such interpretation conflicts with either the procedural or
substantive requirements of ERISA; (4) whether the provisions
have been interpreted consistently; and (5) whether such interpretation is inconsistent with the clear language of the plan. Id. (citing Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 48
F.3d 365, 371 (8th Cir. 1995)). The court noted several examples
of the Committee's unreasonable actions. Id. at 567. For example,
the court stated, by not investing the assets in Statewide stock for a
period beginning in 1991, the Committee admitted that the language of the plan had been interpreted inconsistently. Id. The
court determined that by allowing the Committee to only invest in
Statewide stock, the plan was inconsistent with ERISA because the
Committee's ability to act on behalf of its beneficiaries and participants was constrained. Id.
The panel further stated that if the fiduciary does not read the
plan, it cannot be said to have interpreted it. Id. Judge Greenberg
further indicated that where a fiduciary, because of an arbitrary
decision, fails to exercise a right or power, the court may interpose.
Id. at 568. In this case, because no evidence existed that the Committee ever read or interpreted the plan document, the court is
free to exercise de novo review to interpret whether the plan allowed for -investment in other than Statewide stock. Id. By determining that the interpretation of the plan was not reasonable and
that no evidence existed to show that the Committee read the
ESOP plan documents, the court answered the first question. Id.
The panel ruled that the district court committed an error in hold-
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ing that the Committee was required to invest in Statewide stock.
Id.
The court next reviewed the Committee's contention that an
ESOP fiduciary cannot be liable under ERISA for investing solely
in the stock of the company. Id. Judge Greenberg conceded that
in normal situations, the fiduciaries of an ESOP are exempt from
the diversification provisions of ERISA. Id. Furthermore, the court
noted that the primary purpose of an ESOP is to invest in the employer's securities. Id.
In contrast, the court stated that the fiduciary must also exhibit the ERISA duties of acting with loyalty and care and must
therefore balance the ESOP's goals with the best interest of the
participants. Id. at 569. By citing the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the panel implied that in balancing these
interests, if the best interest of the participant is served by diversification of the plan's assets, the ESOP fiduciary must pursue this investment strategy. Id. at 569-70 (citing Fink v. National Savings and
Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951, 955-56 (D.C. Cir. 19$5)). By following the
District of Columbia Circuit, the Third Circuit answered the second question, and stated that the classification of the plan as an
ESOP did not by itself constrain its investment options. Id. at 570.
While answering the third question, the court struggled to
find the appropriate standard of review for an ESOP fiduciary's investment decisions. Id. at 571-72. When formulating this standard,
the court reiterated that the fiduciary was only presumptively and
not absolutely required to invest in Statewide's stock. Id. at 571.
The court established that the proper standard should be whether
there existed an abuse of discretion. Id.
Instead, Judge Greenberg, citing trust law, established that
there is a rebuttable presumption that the fiduciary did not breach
its ERISA duties. Id. This presumption, according to the judge,
could be overcome by a showing that the fiduciary abused its discretion and did not act consistently with the intent of the plan. Id.
The panel further stated that the judiciary must be cognizant of
the fact that the ESOP fiduciary may face liability if it does not
invest in the company stock and such stock thrives. Id. at 571-72.
In contrast, the court also warned directors of corporations who
serve the dual role of an ESOP fiduciary, that when acting on behalf of the ESOP, they must act impartially and investigate alternative investment opportunities. Id. at 572. In this case, the court
stated that not enough evidence existed in the record to make a
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final determination and remanded the matter to the district court
for proceedings consistent with its analysis. Id.
The court also reviewed Moench's claim that the ESOP fiduciaries failed to join the derivative suit against Statewide's directors.
Id. at 572-73. Avoiding any ruling on the merits of this argument,
the panel stated that such argument was unclear in the briefs. Id.
at 573. The court suggested that upon remand, Moench amend
his complaint to clarify his argument. Id. In summary, the decision of the Third Circuit was to remand counts one, two, and four
of the complaint to the district court. Id.
As with many court decisions, this ruling fails to recognize the
existence of personal responsibility on behalf of the ESOP participants. As noted earlier, participation in the ESOP was voluntary
and contributions could be discontinued at any time. The participants in the ESOP could have spotted the declining stock price as
easily as other investors. Yet, the court implies that because the
fiduciaries had inside knowledge of Statewide's problems, they
should have used this information to evaluate their decision on
whether to continue ESOP investments. This implication not only
contradicts the court's ruling that the directors must act impartially, but essentially allows the ESOP to trade on inside information. In fact, if the ESOP fiduciary was not a corporate insider as
the court suggested, such fiduciary would not have had any more
knowledge than the employees who voluntarily elected to participate in the ESOP.
Although the ESOP fiduciary should not be liable for failing to
cease investing in Statewide's stock, they should not escape liability
if the ESOP represented the only method in which the participants
could have joined the class action derivative suit brought against
the company. If the participants did have notice of the suit, and
could have joined the class independent of the ESOP, than they
must take individual responsibility for their investment decisions.
Because there was not enough information about the plan or the
derivative suit, the circuit court properly decided to remand this
count of the complaint.
The district court on remand must be fearful not to create a
situation where ERISA plan managers and administrators can be
sued for prudent but incorrect investment decisions, especially
where voluntary plans are at issue. The courts must hold individuals accountable for their own investment decisions and not foster
an atmosphere where those individuals look to the courts every
time they lose money. While investing, one quickly learns that
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there is a risk-return tradeoff, where the riskiest investments yield
the greatest potential returns. If an investor in an ERISA plan or
through individual investments does not want to take this risk, he
or she does not have to participate.
Howard J. Ehrlich

TORTS-DRAM

SHOP LIABILITY-UNDER NEW JERSEY LAW A CASINO

PATRON WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO RECOVER GAMBLING
LOSSES FROM A CASINO THAT SERVED THE PATRON FREE ALCOHOL AND ALLOWED HIM TO CONTINUE GAMBLING AFTER HE BECAME VISIBLY INTOXICATED-Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal

Assocs., 70 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff, Ayhan Hakimoglu, brought two separate diversity actions against the defendants, associates of two casinos located in
Atlantic City. 70 F.3d 291, 292. Hakimoglu alleged that he suffered significant gambling losses because the defendants provided
free alcohol to him until he became visibly intoxicated and then
allowed him to continue gambling. Hakimoglu sought damages
and other relief, claiming that the defendants were negligent, that
their conduct was intentional and malicious, and that they were
unjustly enriched. The defendants counterclaimed for recovery of
gambling debts.
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
dismissed both cases because Hakimoglu failed to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. Id. The court entered final
judgment on Hakimoglu's claims although the defendants' counterclaims were not completely adjudicated. Hakimoglu appealed
and the appeals were consolidated. Id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Hakimoglu's claims and remanded for proceedings on the counterclaims. Id. at 294. The court of appeals
held that New Jersey's highest court would not permit a casino patron to recover gambling losses from a casino based on claims like
those alleged by Hakimoglu. Id. at 293, 294.
Judge Aito, writing for the majority, began the opinion by observing that the Third Circuit's task in this case is to forecast
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whether New Jersey's highest court would allow recovery. Id. at
292. The judge noted that because the NewJersey courts have not
confronted the issue at bar, this prediction would be made without
guidance from the state court system. Id. at 292-93. The Third
Circuit stated that it would have certified this important issue to
the NewJersey Supreme Court if NewJersey law allowed such certification, which it does not. Id. at 293. The court admonished that
its opinion will not likely have enduring precedential value because
the New Jersey appellate courts will eventually confront and definitively answer the issue at bar when similar claims are brought in the
state court system. Id. The court noted that conflicting district
court decisions demonstrate that forceful arguments may be made
for both sides of this issue. Id.
Judge Alito articulated four essential reasons that the New
Jersey Supreme Court would likely reject Hakimoglu's claims. See
id. at 293-94. First, the judge observed that New Jersey has held
servers of alcohol liable only for injuries resulting from "drunken
driving, barroom accidents and barroom brawls." Id. at 293. Second, the court stressed that despite heavy regulation of casino operations by the state, there is no indication of legislative intent to
extend dram-shop liability into this area. Id. at 293-94. The Third
Circuit opined that if the legislature intended to hold casinos liable
for permitting drunk patrons to gamble, it would have enacted this
policy. Id. at 294. The court asserted that the legislature must have
foreseen the possible consequences when it explicitly allowed casinos to serve free alcohol to gamblers. Id. Third, Judge Alito noted
that recognition of Hakimoglu's claims would create difficulties of
proof and causation. Id. The judge asserted that gamblers who are
sober may still lose, that gamblers who are drunk may still win, and
that the gamblers will usually lose in any event because the odds
favor the casino. Id. Fourth, the court asserted that fictitious
claims may result if it extended dram shop liability to gambling loss
cases. Id. The Third Circuit discerned that a plaintiff would have
up to two years to file the claim, and that therefore there would be
no credible indication of blood alcohol content and no casino employee would remember the events. Id. Thus, the court predicted
that the New Jersey Supreme Court would deny recovery on
Hakimoglu's claims. Id.
Judge Becker authored a dissenting opinion. Id. at 294-304
(Becker, J., dissenting). The dissent opined that because the
trends in New Jersey have been to establish novel causes of action,
even in heavily regulated areas, the supreme court would likely
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hold a casino liable for gambling losses where the casino continues
to serve alcohol to a visibly intoxicated patron. Id. at 294-95
(Becker, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that there is a high likelihood that the supreme court would establish a new theory of recovery where a defendant benefits from engaging in conduct
which results in foreseeable harm and could have prevented the
harm by exercising due care. Id. at 295 (Becker, J., dissenting).
Judge Becker began the analysis by observing policies and
trends in New Jersey jurisprudence. Id. at 295-96 (Becker, J., dissenting). The judge recognized that New Jersey has liberally expanded tort liability in several contexts. Id. at 295 (Becker, J.,
dissenting). The dissent stressed that although alcohol has been
heavily regulated for years, servers of alcohol have consistently
been held liable by the supreme court for foreseeable drinkingrelated harm. Id. Judge Becker noted that tavern owners may be
held liable for serving alcohol to drunk persons who then drive
and either cause injury or damage property. Id. at 295-96 (Becker,
J., dissenting). The judge observed that similar liability has been
imposed on social hosts although they do not benefit from their
conduct. Id. at 296 (Becker, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that
both Aboud and Create Bay forecasted that NewJersey would extend
dram shop liability to casinos. Id. (citing GNOC Corp. v. Aboud, 715
F. Supp. 644 (D.N.J. 1989); Tose v. Greate Bay Hotel and Casino, Inc.,
819 F. Supp. 1312 (D.N.J. 1993)).
Next, Judge Becker analyzed this case in light of four principles enumerated in Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, which are to be
weighed in determining whether a tort duty exists. Id. at 296-99
(Becker, J., dissenting) (citing Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132
N.J. 426, 625 A.2d 1110 (1993)). The judge argued that the first
principle to be considered, "the relationship of the parties," favors
imposition of liability on the casino. Id. at 296 (Becker, J., dissenting). The dissent analogized between the casino-patron relationship and the tavern-patron relationship. Id. The judge advocated
that because a tavern owner must ensure that the alcohol he serves
does not cause a patron to harm himself or another, a casino
should bear similar responsibility to prevent harm in the form of
extreme gambling. Id.
Turning to the second principle, "the nature of the risk,"
Judge Becker opined that this foreseeability test also favors casino
liability. Id. at 297 (Becker, J., dissenting). The judge stressed the
foreseeability of excessive gambling losses resulting from alcohol
consumption. Id. The dissent discerned that cases which refused
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to extend tort liability were based on lack of foreseeability, and that
therefore these decisions were inapplicable to the case at bar. Id.
Judge Becker further noted that lack of foreseeability is also the
reason that NewJersey has limited the liability of taverns and social
hosts to physical harm and property damage. Id. The judge observed that the supreme court has stated that tort liability is proper
if the losses are foreseeable. Id. The dissent refuted the defendants' argument that extreme results would flow from imposition of
liability on a casino, illustrating that lack of foreseeability would
prevent a restaurant from being liable if a patron became intoxicated at the restaurant and incurs losses at the casino. Id.
Judge Becker stated that the third Hopkins factor, "the opportunity and ability to exercise care," also requires imposition of liability. Id. The judge contended that casinos have a greater ability
than tavern owners to avoid liability because the continuous monitoring of gamblers by the casino's staff and cameras will indicate
when a patron is intoxicated and should not be served more alcohol. Id. at 297-98 (Becker, J., dissenting). Although the dissent
conceded that an intoxicated patron may be found contributorily
negligent because of failure to exercise care, it explained that this
finding should apportion damages between all parties who are responsible for the loss rather than serve as a basis to deny the cause
of action completely. Id. at 298 (Becker, J., dissenting).
The dissent opined that the fourth factor, "the public interest
in the proposed solution," similarly indicates New Jersey's likely
recognition of a cause of action in this case. Id. Judge Becker explained that New Jersey has historically maintained stringent control over gambling and viewed it as an "evil" activity which should
generally be banned absent a constitutional clause or amendment
permitting the activity. Id. The judge pronounced that the extensive regulatory scheme of the 1977 Casino Control Act exemplifies
the state's policy of protecting the public, and that the Act focuses
more on regulating the casinos than punishing the gamblers. Id.
(citing NJ. STAT. ANN.§ 5:12-1 to 190 (West 1995)). To illustrate
New Jersey's recognition of the political influence which casinos
possess, the dissent recited the state's expressed policy to strictly
regulate casinos in order to maintain public trust in the state's regulatory power. Id. The dissent concluded that all of these reasons
favor recovery under New Jersey law. Id. at 299 (Becker, J.,
dissenting).
Next, the dissent proceeded to dismantle two arguments
which the district court and the majority relied upon in denying
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recovery. Id. at 299-300 (Becker, J., dissenting). First, Judge
Becker rejected the argument that Miller v. Zory undermined Aboud
by refusing to hold a casino liable for violation of credit regulations. Id. at 299 (Becker, J., dissenting) (citing Miller v. Zoby, 250
N.J. Super. 568, 595 A.2d 1104 (App. Div.), certif denied, 127 N.J.
553, 606 A.2d 366 (1991)). Thejudge instructed that Zoby involved
an implied cause of action under the Casino Control Act, while the
case at bar, Aboud, and Tose all involved a common law tort cause of
action, which New Jersey would more likely recognize. Id.
Second, Judge Becker discredited the argument that the state
legislature's extensive regulation of casinos mandates rejection of
common law tort liability. Id. at 299-300 (Becker, J., dissenting).
The judge contended that this "scope preemption" theory errs by
analyzing the issue as a federal court would rather than as the New
Jersey Supreme Court would. Id. at 299 (Becker, J., dissenting).
The dissent stressed that although federal jurisprudence would require deference to the legislature, New Jersey's jurisprudence
would likely favor recognition of a cause of action despite legislative regulation where the four Hopkins factors exist. Id. The judge
noted that the supreme court has explicitly proclaimed the judiciary's power to decide the proper boundaries of tort liability. Id. at
299-300 (Becker J., dissenting). The judge further observed that
the supreme court has utilized this power by imposing liability for
drinking-related harm although legislative regulation of the conduct existed. Id. at 300 (Becker, J., dissenting).
The dissent proffered an additional reason why the scope preemption rationale should fail. Id. Judge Becker observed that casinos may not serve alcohol to visibly intoxicated persons. Id. (citing
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-103(d) & (f)(2) (West 1995); N.J. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 13:2-23.1(b) (1995)). The judge further observed that
under the Licensed Alcoholic Beverage Server Act, licensees other
than casinos who serve alcohol to intoxicated persons are liable for
physical injury and property damage. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:22A-1 to -7 (West 1995)). The judge discerned that the scope
preemption approach, taken to its logical extension, would exonerate a casino of liability for drunk driving deaths caused by a patron
that the casino served while intoxicated. Id. The dissent stressed
that this would lead to the absurd result that liability would be imposed on a social host for harm that his guest suffered after the
host continued to serve him, while a casino would not be liable for
harm to third parties injured by the casino's drunk patron. Id.
Judge Becker then proceeded to rebut seven policy reasons
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which the district court enunciated for denying recognition of a
cause of action. Id. at 300-02 (Becker, J., dissenting). The judge
considered the first two reasons together, which argued that an aggrieved gambler has no inhibitions regardless of the alcohol and
that he received the risk he anticipated. Id. at 300 (Becker, J., dissenting). The dissent rebutted these contentions by proffering
that, because the gambling odds are in the casino's favor and the
casino will typically win, gambling is a type of consumption similar
to drinking. Id. at 301 (Becker, J., dissenting). The judge reiterated that taverns are liable for injuries to their patrons caused by
excessive drinking. Id. at 300-01 (Becker, J., dissenting). The dissent analogized that just as alcohol can decrease inhibitions and
cause a patron to drink more than he otherwise would, it can also
cause a casino patron to gamble more than he otherwise would. Id.
at 301 (Becker, J., dissenting).
The dissent quickly disposed of the district court's third argument that gambling does not require skill and therefore responsible gambling cannot be hampered by alcohol. Id. Judge Becker
retorted that certain games do, in fact, require skill and that, in any
event, alcohol can impair the gambler's judgment regarding when
to cease gambling. Id.
The dissent then addressed the district court's fourth objection to recovery, problems of proof and causation. Id. Judge
Becker discerned that the relevant inquiry is whether the gambler's
intoxicated state hampers his ability to decide when to cease gambling, not whether the intoxication affects his ability to play well.
Id. The judge posited that the difficulty of proving the causal link
between a gambler's intoxication and his losses is not as great as
establishing the cause of cancer in toxic tort cases, and that, in any
event, the difficulty is an insufficient basis for predicting that New
Jersey would not recognize the claim. Id. The dissent opined that
Hakimoglu's allegations should at least survive a motion to dismiss
and a jury should decide whether in a particular case the casino's
conduct in continuing to serve alcohol to the drunk gambler
caused the gambler to lose his ability to reasonably judge when to
stop playing. Id. Judge Becker reiterated that the jury may find the
gambler contributorily negligent or absolve the casino completely,
but stressed that the decision should be the jury's. Id.
Next, Judge Becker discredited the objection that fictitious
claims would result if dram shop liability was extended to recognize
this cause of action. Id. at 301-02 (Becker, J., dissenting). The
judge asserted that New Jersey recognizes several dram shop ac-
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tions which are brought without prompt investigation of blood alcohol content and interviewing of witnesses. Id. at 301 (Becker, J.,
dissenting). The dissent further proffered that the enormous cost
and risk involved with bringing claims similar to Hakimoglu's
would adequately limit the filing of such actions to the rare cases
where substantial losses are incurred. Id. at 301-02 (Becker, J., dissenting). The dissent also suggested that a casino may protect itself
by marking and preserving surveillance tapes of high rollers who
are losing and drinking excessively. Id. at 302 (Becker, J.,
dissenting).
The dissent proceeded to address the sixth objection, that the
casinos are already sufficiently deterred from engaging in misconduct because credit markers which intoxicated patrons enter into
cannot be enforced. Id. Judge Becker recognized that this fact
does not act as a deterrent where the losses are not on credit. Id.
The judge conceded that overdeterrence in torts should be
avoided because overly zealous precautions would be taken by a
party who had plenty to lose but not much to gain. Id. The dissent
explained that overdeterrence is unlikely in this situation, however,
because a casino would not be liable beyond the amount which it
gained as a result of its misconduct. Id. Judge Becker asserted,
therefore, that a casino has plenty to gain from serving alcohol to
drunk gamblers but not much to lose, even if the cause of action at
issue is recognized. Id. The judge admonished that underdeterrence is the more likely problem because only a small number of
gamblers will sue and win their losses back. Id.
Judge Becker quickly rebutted the district court's final argument that a casino has never been ordered by the casino commission to refund the losses of a drunk patron. Id. The judge noted
that this argument undermines the district court's previous assertion that sufficient deterrence of casino misconduct already exists,
because there cannot be sufficient deterrence if there has never
been enforcement. Id. at 302 n.8 (Becker, J., dissenting). The dissent maintained that, in any event, the decisions and policies of the
casino commission are irrelevant in predicting whether the New
Jersey Supreme Court would recognize this cause of action under
common law. Id. at 302 (Becker, J., dissenting). The dissent therefore concluded that the state's high court would recognize this
cause of action. Id.
The dissent concluded its opinion by urging New Jersey to
adopt a certification procedure. Id. at 302-04 (Becker, J., dissenting). Judge Becker observed that where there is a lack of state law
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to guide the resolution of the case, the federal courts are forced to
engage in a blind prediction of how the state courts would rule. Id.
at 302 (Becker, J., dissenting). The judge stressed that this results
in the federal courts' formulation of state policy in violation of rudimentary principles of federalism, and involves the danger that
the federal courts will inadvertently base their decisions on interpretive assumptions not shared by the state courts. Id. The dissent
articulated that New Jersey is among a small minority of states
which have failed to adopt a certification provision. Id. Therefore,
the dissent proposed that New Jersey promulgate a certification
procedure which would allow federal courts to certify a legal issue
to the state court if three elements are met: the issue is important,
the issue may be dispositive, and no controlling precedent exists
under state law. Id. at 303-04 (Becker, J., dissenting).
The Third Circuit erred in predicting that the New Jersey
Supreme Court would not recognize Hakimoglu's cause of action.
Rather than simply refusing to recognize novel causes of action,
the supreme court's propensity in the tort area has leaned more
toward developing ways to limit those plaintiffs who may recover
under a newly recognized cause of action. By focusing on limitation rather than outright dismissal, New Jersey has repeatedly
struck the balance between ensuring that all parties responsible for
harm will pay their share and preventing undue expansion of tort
liability. As the dissent correctly observed, the enormous expense
involved with bringing an action such as Hakimoglu's is one inherent deterrent that will ensure limitation of these actions to rare
cases where substantial losses are incurred by high rollers. Id. at
301-02 (Becker, J., dissenting). The supreme court would likely expand upon this limitation by promulgating guidelines to further
limit recovery.
Since all of the Hopkins criteria are met, as explained by the
dissent, New Jersey would likely recognize this cause of action. Id.
at 296-99 (Becker, J., dissenting). The supreme court would place
reliance in the jury to properly allocate liability between the casino
and patron. Since a patron voluntarily consumes the alcohol
which the casino provides, he should always be responsible to some
extent for his own negligence in allowing himself to become intoxicated. Therefore, the jury may find the patron either completely
or partly responsible for his own loss. It would be unrealistic, however, to claim that a casino has engaged in no misconduct by not
only failing to prevent foreseeable harm, but rather encouraging it
by continuing to serve alcohol to a patron whose judgment as to
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when to stop gambling is obviously impaired. Therefore, New
Jersey would likely allow a jury to hear such cases and decide
whether liability should be apportioned or whether the gambler
should bear full responsibility. New Jersey's willingness to recognize novel causes of action reflects an admirable theme that a
plaintiff who suffers loss which may have been partly caused by another should at least have his day in court.
Anthony Fernandez

BANKRUPTCY-DISCHARGEABILITY-FOR
TO BE DISCHARGED

PURSUANT

A STUDENT-LOAN

DEBT

TO THE "UNDUE HARDSHIP"

Ex-

CEPTION IN THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, A GRIEVOUS, IRREVOCABLE
FINANCIAL SITUATION WHICH PLACED THE DEBTOR NEAR OR BE-

LOW THE POVERTY LEVEL, MUST EXIST THROUGHOUT MOST OF
THE REPAYMENT PERIOD-Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance

Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), No. 95-7178, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
33167 (3d Cir. Nov. 28, 1995).
On September 27, 1993, MarjorieJo Faish filed for bankruptcy
under Chapter 7 in the Middle District of Pennsylvania Bankruptcy

Court. 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 33167 at *3. Faish also submitted a
complaint to the court on that day to ascertain the dischargeability
of her student loan to the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency (PHEAA). Faish, who earned a Master's Degree from
the University of Pittsburgh in Public Health and Community
Health Services Administration in 1989, borrowed $31,879.31 from
the PHEAA to finance her education. On November 13, 1991,
Faish began monthly indemnification payments to the PHEAA of
approximately $300 per month. Id. at *6 n.2. This reimbursement
ceased on June 2, 1993, at which time $4,629.92 of her original
principal liability ifas repaid. Faish owed the PHEAA $32,989.33
when she filed for bankruptcy in September of 1993.
At the time of trial, Faish was employed as a budget analyst by
the Department of Public Welfare, Bureau of Financial Operations
in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, earning an annual salary of
roughly $27,000. Id. at *3. Faish, a thirty-year-old single mother
with one son, received no financial support from the child's father.
Id. at *4. Although her search for a higher-paying position was un-
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successful, Faish tried to save funds for a car and a residence in a
community more suitable to raise her son. In addition, Faish suffered from a persistent bowel ailment known as Crohn's disease
and from back problems.
The Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
conducted a trial on December 22, 1993, regarding the dischargeability matter. Id. at *3. On July 12, 1994, the court granted
Faish partial relief, giving great weight to her position as a single
mother wanting to furnish a better environment for her child. Id.
at *4, *6. In rendering its decision, the bankruptcy court applied
the tripartite analysis formulated by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Bankruptcy Court in reJohnson to evaluate whether repayment of Faish's student loan would result in "undue hardship." Id.
at *4-5 (citing In reJohnson, 5 B.R. 532 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979)).
Assessing the first arm of the Johnson test, a "mechanical" inquiry, the court decided that Faish did not demonstrate the requisite financial inability to repay her debt obligation in the
foreseeable future. Id. at *5 (citing In re Faish, No. 93-01686, slip
op. at 5 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. July 12, 1994)). The bankruptcy court
continued with its analysis, even though the Johnson court explicitly
stated that a student-loan debtor's inadequate satisfaction of the
first prong must result in denial of discharge. Id. (citing In reJohnson, 5 B.R. at 544). The court concluded that Faish passed the second prong, a "good faith" test, but that the final "policy" test was
not met since "avoidance of the obligation was a significant consideration in the filing." Id. at *5 (quoting Faish, No. 93-01686, slip
op. at 6). Despite Faish's failure of the Johnson test, the bankruptcy
court held that only $15,000 of the debt obligation was to be repaid, remarking that courts have some margin of discretion in deciding nondischargeability. Id. at *6 (citing Faish, No. 93-01686,
slip. op. at 7).
The PHEAA appealed the bankruptcy court's decision. Id. at
*6 (quoting In re Faish,No. 94-1353, slip op. at 6 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 21,
1995)). On February 21, 1995, the Middle District of Pennsylvania
District Court reversed the bankruptcy court's decision in a memorandum opinion. Id. at *7. The district court held that it was not
bound by the Johnson test, but would adhere to its basic framework.
Id. (citing Faish, No. 94-1353, slip. op. at 4 n.2). Noting that the
Johnson analysis was underinclusive, the court proclaimed that in
order to excuse a student loan obligation, the hardship alleged by
the debtor must be exceptional and substantial. Id. at *7-8 (citing
Faish, No. 94-1353, slip op. at 7). In Faish's case, however, the dis-
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trict court resolved that given her auspicious employment prospects, discharging the student loan obligation would set a
precarious precedent, endangering the protracted feasibility of
government-guaranteed student loans. Id. at *8 (citing Faish, no.
94-1353, slip op. at 7-8). Therefore, the court decreed that Faish's
student debt was completely nondischargeable. Id. (citing Faish,
no. 94-1353, slip op. at 8). The United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. Id. at *28.
The circuit court adopted a new "undue hardship" standard to be
applied in all Third Circuit bankruptcy courts when determining
the dischargeability of student loan obligations pursuant to
§ 523(a) (8) (B) of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at *23. Applying this
test, the court concluded that Faish did not meet the burden of
establishing undue hardship; therefore, the entire loan debt was
nondischargeable. Id. at *26.
Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Cowen began the
court's analysis by reviewing § 523(a) (8) (B) of the Bankruptcy
Code, a component of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Id. at
*8-9. The judge stressed Congress's inclusion of the "undue hardship" exception in the Bankruptcy Code, under which debtors seek
relief from student loan obligations. Id. at *9. The Third Circuit
reported that courts evaluate whether a debtor qualifies for discharge by considering individual circumstances as well as the legislative purpose of that section. Id. at *9-10. The panel then noted
prior opinions that reviewed the legislative history of
§ 523(a) (8) (B) and determined that Congress intended to limit
dischargeability in an effort to avert abuse of the bankruptcy process, and to safeguard the solvency of student loan programs. Id. at
*10 (citing In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d 737, 743 (3rd Cir. 1993)).
Before confronting the merits of Faish's case, the Third Circuit proclaimed that it needed to conclusively adopt a single test to
determine "undue hardship" in accordance with the purpose of
§ 523(a) (8) (B) so that litigants know which standard will dictate
their case. Id. at *11. The judge noted that there is no unified or
dominant approach governing when the "undue hardship" exception should be applied; courts throughout the country utilize several tests. Id. at *12. The court focused o'n three prominent
"undue hardship" tests applied to ascertain the dischargeability of
student loan debt. Id. at *12-13.
Initially, Judge Cowen scrutinized the three-pronged Johnson
test, which was embraced by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Bankruptcy Court in In re Johnson. Id. at *13. Judge Cowen ex-
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plained that the Johnson test requires a three-part inquiry: a
mechanical test, a good faith test, and a policy test. Id. at *13-15
(citing In reJohnson, 5 B.R. 532, 544 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979)). The
mechanical test, the judge revealed, requires the reviewing court to
analyze whether the debtor's future foreseeable financial resources
are sufficient to fund student loan payments and still allow the
debtor and his dependents to remain out of poverty. Id. at *13-14
(citing Johnson, 5 B.R. at 544). If the examining court answers the
inquiry in the affirmative, Judge Cowen professed, the student loan
must be deemed nondischargeable. Id. If the inquiry is answered
negatively, the panel asserted, the court must proceed to the good
faith prong. Id at *14 (citing Johnson, 5 B.R. at 544).
The good faith examination, the court averred, requires resolution of whether the debtor was negligent in managing his finances or attempting to procure employment. Id. (citing Johnson,
5 B.R. at 544). If the court finds that the debtor was not negligent,
Judge Cowen stated, the student-loan obligation may be discharged. Id. The Third Circuit enunciated that if this question is
answered in the affirmative, then it must be determined whether
such irresponsibility would have varied the answer to the mechanical inquiry. Id. If the court uncovers that the response to the
mechanical prong would have been altered, the judge explicated, a
rebuttable presumption against discharge is created that may be
overcome by a negative response to the final test. Id. The court
proceeded with the third prong, the policy test, which entailed
resolving, first, whether the main purpose of the bankruptcy petition was to excuse the student loan and, second, whether the
debtor had explicitly profited from the education financed by the
loan. Id. at *14-15 (citing Johnson, 5 B.R. at 544). If both parts of
this query are answered negatively, the judge recounted, then the
student loan debt should be excused. Id. at *15 (quotingJohnson, 5
B.R. at 544). Judge Cowen submitted, however, that if the inquiry
evokes a positive response, discharge should be refused. Id.
The court perceived the Johnson standard as in accord with its
interpretation of the "undue burden" exception's purpose of protecting the bankruptcy process and guarding the fiscal integrity of
the educational loan program, since very few debts are discharged
if the test is applied properly. Id. at *15. The judge rejected this
test, however, finding it needlessly complex. Id. Judge Cowen also
noted that the Johnson test lacked any provisions to allow bankruptcy courts to weigh relevant "equitable considerations" when
deliberating dischargeability. Id.
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The Third Circuit next considered the "undue hardship" exception standard of review set forth by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Bankruptcy Court in In re Bryant. Id. at *15-16 (citing In re
Bryant, 72 B.R. 913 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987)). The judge commented that the Bryant court found the Johnson test too complex
and announced an alternative "undue hardship" examination that
it hoped would provide an objective evaluation of student loan
debt dischargeability. Id. at *16 (citing Bryant, 72 B.R. at 915 n.2).
The court described the Bryant test, which compared the
debtor's resources with the United States Bureau of the Census
federal poverty figures to evaluate the dischargeability of the student loan debt. Id. at *16-17 (citing Bryant, 72 B.R. at 915). If the
debtor's income does not significantly exceed the federal guidelines, the debt will be discharged only if the debtor proves unique
and extraordinary circumstances, the Third Circuit explained. Id.
at *16 (citing Bryant, 72 B.R. at 915). If the debtor's resources are
near or under the federal poverty guideline, the court stated, the
lender must prove that the federal guidelines are an unreasonable
gauge of the debtor's ability to repay the loan. Id. at *16-17 (citing
Bryant, 72 B.R. at 915).
Judge Cowen viewed the Bryant test as inconsistent with the
congressional goals of eliminating debtor abuse and preserving the
integrity of the educational loan program because it denied consideration of the justifiability of the debtor's expenditures. Id. at *17.
The judge also believed the Bryant test's objective slant was deficient because it did not take into account that student loan debtors
often seek discharge because their "subjective value judgments" are
indicative of a prodigal attitude that a court should contemplate
before excusing their debt obligations. Id. at *17-18. Finally, the
Third Circuit comprehended the Bryant court's refusal to consider
whether the debtor was seeking discharge of primarily student loan
debts as contrary to legislative intent, since Congress enacted
§ 523(a) (8) (B) in part to make dischargeability of student loans
more arduous. Id. at *18.
Judge Cowen then examined the tripartite analysis for the "undue hardship" exemption promulgated by the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in Brunner. Id. at *19 (citing Brunnerv. New York
State Higher Education Services Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987)).
The court provided the test, which stated that a student loan debt
will be excused if: the debtor is unable to sustain a minimum standard of living while making loan payments; there are additional
circumstances that indicate this inability will likely endure for a sig-
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nificant part of the student loan's repayment term; and the debtor
has exerted good faith efforts to reimburse the lender for the student loan. Id. (citing Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396). The judge acknowledged that the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
officially ratified the Brunner standard in In re Roberson, where the
Seventh Circuit delineated how to properly apply the test. Id. at
*20 (citing In re Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1132 (7th Cir. 1993)).
The Third Circuit cited the Roberson court's assertion that the
Brunner test's first prong commands an examination into the
debtor's present financial state to determine if loan repayments
would lower his standard of living below the subsistence level. Id.
(citing Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1135). If the first prong is not satisfied, Judge Cowen remarked, the Roberson court forbade continuing with the other parts of the Brunner analysis. Id. (citing
Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1135).
The Third Circuit proceeded with the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the second arm of the Brunner test, requiring a showing of additional circumstances that demonstrate that the debtor's
inability will likely continue for a significant part of the student
loan's indemnification period. Id. (citing Brunner, 999 F.2d at
396). The Third Circuit commented that the Roberson court imputed a requirement that the debtor establish a grievous financial
situation that will likely persist for most of the repayment period.
Id. at *20-21 (citing Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1135). Only if the second
prong is met, the court observed, does the Seventh Circuit allow
progression to the final inquiry, the good faith test, which it viewed
as requiring a showing that repayment would cause undue hardship due to "'factors beyond [the debtor's] reasonable control."'
Id. at *21 (quoting Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1136).
The court announced that it would adopt the Brunner test, as
interpreted by the Seventh Circuit in Roberson, because it was consistent with congressional intent and was the most logical test. Id.
at *22-23. The Third Circuit espied the Brunner analysis as equitable to the debtor by not insisting that he or she live in poverty for
an extended period of time before an educational loan may be excused. Id. at *23. On the other hand, Judge Cowen pronounced,
the fiscal integrity of the educational loan program is protected
because debtors are not excused from their obligations merely because repayment would result in significant sacrifices. Id. The
court proclaimed that the "undue hardship" test from Brunner
must now be implemented in all Third Circuit bankruptcy courts.
Id.
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Turning to the case at hand, the court applied the Brunnertest
to the bankruptcy court's factual findings to ascertain whether
Faish had met the burden of proving that repayment of her student loan debt would inflict an "undue hardship" upon her. Id. at
*24. The Third Circuit concluded that Faish failed to prove that
her current disposable income placed her below a minimum living
standard if she was forced to make payments of her student loans.
Id. at *25 (citing Faish, No. 93-01686, slip op. at 5). Thus, the judge
held that it was unnecessary to address the second and third
prongs of the court's newly adopted standard, and Faish was obligated to repay her entire student loan debt. Id. at *26.
Judge Cowen next disposed of Faish's claim that her failure to
find a position in her chosen field requires a finding in favor of
discharge, maintaining that Faish had not established an inability
to secure any type of work during a significant portion of the loan
indemnification period. Id. (citing Brunner, 46 B.R. at 757-58
(S.D.N.Y. 1985)). The Third Circuit buttressed its decision by remarking that Faish had requested discharge in order to devote resources to buying a new car and moving into a new apartment,
money which could have otherwise been allocated to student loan
payments. Id. at *28. In sum, the court concluded that because
Faish failed to establish that undue hardship would result if she
were forced to repay her debt under the Third Circuit's newly ratified Brunner standard, her entire student loan obligation was nondischargeable. Id. at *28.
The standard adopted by the Third Circuit in Faish demonstrates a reasonable and equitable approach to evaluating whether
a student loan debt is dischargeable pursuant to the "undue hardship" exception in the Bankruptcy Code. A student loan is a voluntary purchase of debt that makes repayment a binding obligation;
as such, it should only be discharged in the most dire circumstances. The second prong of the Brunner test adopted by the
Third Circuit, which requires a showing of a grievous, unrevokable
financial situation, ensures that a debt will not be excused unless
an extreme tribulation is established. Furthermore, by preventing
discharge in cases where repayment causes ordinary hardships or
tight finances if the loan is repaid, the newly adopted test also upholds the legislative goals of preventing misuse of the bankruptcy
process and safeguarding the solvency and credibility of the educational loan program.
Michele S. Grief
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EDUCATION-SPECIAL EDUCATION SERVICES-A DAMAGES ACTION
FOR FAILURE TO PROPERLY ADDRESS A STUDENT'S SPECIAL EDUCATION NEEDS Is APPROPRIATE DESPITE A WAIVER IN A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

IF THE WAIVER WAS

NOT KNOWING AND

VOLUNTARY IN CONSIDERATION OF ALL SURROUNDING CIRCUM-

STANCES-WB. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1995).

In the summer of 1991, W.B. and her child, E.J., moved to
Hackettstown, New Jersey. 67 F.3d 484, 488. Prior to the beginning of the school year, W.B. met with the principal of the elementary school to discuss W.B.'s concerns regarding E.J.'s behavior
problems. At that time, W.B. also noted that E.J. had gone to a
speech therapist.
In September 1991, E.J. started the first grade. Soon thereafter, his teacher reported E.J.'s disruptive behavioral problems and
observed his difficulty in completing certain tasks. E.J.'s first grade
teacher informed W.B. that E.J. might suffer from Attention Deficit
Disorder/Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). W.B.
had no prior knowledge of that condition or its symptoms.
In October, W.B. had a meeting with E.J.'s teacher and the
administrator responsible for assuring compliance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act (§504). Although they discussed E.J.'s problems, no
one recommended that E.J. be evaluated, suggested special education services, or informed W.B. of E.J.'s probable entitlement to
the services. At the same time, E.J. began therapy with a private
therapist who later diagnosed E.J. as suffering from ADHD. Subsequently, W.B. discussed the disorder with the principal and
teacher. W.B. also wrote to them explaining her belief that E.J.'s
behavioral problems were due to ADHD. In this letter W.B. specifically requested that E.J. spend additional time in the resource
room.
The first dispute arose when W.B. requested that E.J. be referred to the Mansfield Child Study Team (CST) for evaluation.
Although the school initially refused, W.B. eventually persuaded
the school to approve the evaluation. Id. at 489. The CST concluded that E.J. suffered from ADHD and qualified for §504 services in April 1992. The CST, however, found that E.J. was not
eligible for services provided under the IDEA because he was performing above or at grade level in all skill areas.
Although the CST concluded that EJ. qualified for §504 services, the school did not begin to provide them. After the CST eval-
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uation, W.B. asked for an independent evaluation at the school's
expense because she was not satisfied that the CST had fully assessed E.J.'s condition.
In June 1992, W.B. instituted the first of many administrative
proceedings (E.J. I). In this proceeding, W.B. sought, inter alia, an
independent assessment of E.J.'s condition. On the day of the
hearing, the Board of Education signed a consent order authorizing the evaluation and adjourning the proceeding on the remaining issues of the petition. The independent evaluation determined
that in addition to ADHD, E.J. suffered from Tourette's Syndrome
and an obsessive-compulsive disorder. Thus, the administrative
judge noted that W.B. correctly believed that the CST had not completely diagnosed E.J.'s condition.
E.J. started the second grade in September 1992, notwithstanding the continuation of his behavioral problems and the
school's failure to provide §504 services. Despite the conclusions
of the independent evaluation, the CST still refused to classify E.J.
as neurologically impaired, which would qualify him for higher
level IDEA services. Id. at 489-90. In April 1993, W.B. and the
Board of Education reached a settlement agreement which: stipulated that E.J.'s classification would be changed to neurologically
impaired, incorporated a lengthy Individual Education Program
(IEP), and provided $14,000 for W.B.'s costs and attorney's fees.
Id. at 490.
W.B. initiated the current action several months after the settlement alleging claims directly under §504, as well as under 42
U.S.C. §1983 for violations of due process, equal protection and
rights secured by the IDEA, §504, and state statutes. Id. at 490-91.
Seeking damages for the school's failure to provide E.J. with an
appropriate public education, W.B. sued the individual defendants
in their official and individual capacities. Id. at 491.
The defendants made a motion to dismiss the action arguing
that the E.J. I settlement barred the action and that the plaintiff
failed to exhaust the administrative remedies regarding the claims
not addressed in the settlement. Id. The district court initially denied the motion, concluding that the settlement did not bar the
claims and that additional administrative proceedings would be
pointless. Id.
The defendants then moved for dismissal or alternatively, for
reconsideration reasserting their previous arguments, and further
argued that the defendants enjoyed qualified immunity. Id. The
district court reversed itself and entered summary judgment for
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the defendants finding that the suit was barred because the settlement unambiguously provided for the resolution of the dispute.
Id.
In a unanimous opinion, the Third Circuit affirmed in part,
reversed in part and vacated in part the district court's decision.
Id. at 488. The Third Circuit held that the settlement agreement
did not clearly waive the claims and therefore reversed the district
court's summary disposition of the issue. Id. The court further
held that an action may be brought and damages are recoverable
under §1983 claims based on violations of the IDEA and §504. Id.
at 496. In addition, the Third Circuit concluded that the exhaustion requirement was excused in this case. Id. Finally, the court
found that the plaintiffs' allegations of the defendants' failure to
follow the specific federal and statutory schemes sufficiently established statutory and constitutional violations and that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 501-02.
Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Sarokin began the
court's analysis by discussing the legislation involved. Id. at 491.
Judge Sarokin first observed that Congress passed the IDEA to insure that handicapped children receive a free appropriate education. Id. In order for a state to satisfy the IDEA obligations, the
court observed that the state must demonstrate that all disabled
children residing in the state and who need special education services are "identified, located and evaluated." Id. at 492 (citing 20
U.S.C. §1412(2) (C)). Judge Sarokin also recognized that developing an IEP is the primary method of providing a free appropriate
education. Id. The judge noted, however, that a school must also
"mainstream" handicapped students to the greatest extent possible. Id. The court then discussed the enforcement mechanisms,
including federal review of state compliance and the various procedures afforded to parents, including the judicial review of an administrative decision. Id. Finally, Judge Sarokin observed that New
Jersey fulfills its obligations through a statutory scheme which requires each district to discharge the duties imposed by the IDEA
and §504. Id.
In the same manner, the court surveyed the Rehabilitation
Act. Id. Judge Sarokin explained that the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against the disabled in federally funded programs, whereas the IDEA imposes an affirmative duty upon the
state to furnish a free appropriate education. Id. After outlining
the requirements for establishing a §504 violation, the court noted

19961

SURVEY

959

that there is little distinction between requirements of §504 and
the provisions of IDEA. Id. at 492-93.
The court then addressed the defendants' argument that the
plaintiffs' claims are barred because they failed to exhaust the administrative remedies. Id. at 493. In order to analyze the exhaustion issue, the court first reviewed the statutory language and
history and asserted that §1983 conferred a private right of action
in the case at bar. Id. at 493-94. Noting that the availability of a
private right of action should not be equated with the availability of
certain remedies, Judge Sarokin next turned to the availability of
damages under §504 and the IDEA. Id. at 494. Recognizing the
presumption in favor of any appropriate relief, the court agreed
with the Eighth Circuit in concluding that monetary damages are
appropriately sought directly under §504 as well as under a §1983
claim based on §504. Id. at 494 (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County
Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 66 (1992); Rodgers v. Magnet Cove Pub. Schs.,
34 F.3d 642, 645 (8th Cir. 1994)).
Turning to the IDEA, the court concluded that its language
and legislative history did not contain a clear direction sufficient to
overcome the presumption that all appropriate remedies are available. Id. In support of that conclusion, the court cited decisions
by other courts of appeals which have held the same. Id. at 495.
The court cautioned, however, that a district court may consider
other appropriate remedies rather than resorting to compensatory
damages for general pain and suffering. Id.
Having authorized an action for damages for violations of the
IDEA and §504, the court noted that the IDEA requires that a
plaintiff exhaust the administrative remedies prior to commencing
a civil action seeking relief available under the IDEA unless such
exhaustion would be futile or inadequate. Id. Consequently,
Judge Sarokin observed that, under the plain language of the statute, exhaustion is not required in this case because damages are
not an available remedy under the IDEA. Id. at 496. In addition,
the court explained that where, as here, the relief sought in the
civil action is unavailable under the IDEA, exhaustion is excused as
futile. Id. Moreover, Judge Sarokin reasoned that the purpose of
the exhaustion requirement, to assure the development of the factual record, would not be furthered because the record was developed in the various administrative proceedings. Id.
Judge Sarokin next turned to the issue of the settlement agreement. Id. After reciting the relevant language of the agreement,
the court considered the appropriate standard to govern the agree-
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ment. Id. at 496-97. The court rejected traditional contract principles regarding waivers and concluded that a totality of the
circumstances test, which governs waivers of civil rights, applies to
settlement agreements which waive related IDEA claims. Id. at 49798. Judge Sarokin reasoned that the heightened standard was appropriate because parents may easily be persuaded to waive their
rights to such claims given their desire to commence special services when faced with resistant school officials. Id. Thus, the court
will enforce the agreement if the release was voluntary and knowing in consideration of all of the surrounding circumstances. Id. at
497, 498.
Finding a dispute of fact as to whether, inter alia, the agreement clearly and specifically addressed a waiver of damage claims,
the Board of Education gave any consideration for the waiver, and
whether W.B. understood that the waiver included the damage
claims, the court held that the district court's summary disposition
of the issue in favor of the defendants was inappropriate. Id. at
498-99. Finding that the settlement agreement did not clearly
waive the damage claims, the court did not reach the issue of
whether such waivers violated public policy. Id. at 488.
Judge Sarokin continued the court's analysis by addressing the
issue of qualified immunity. Id. at 499. Before deciding whether
the defendants, in their individual capacities, enjoyed qualified immunity, the court noted that the initial consideration is whether
the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged constitutional and statutory violations. Id. at 499.
Dividing the plaintiffs' allegations into two time periods for
purposes of its analysis, the court found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged violations of the IDEA and §504 and that defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 500, 502. In
particular, the court held that plaintiffs' allegations-that defendants failed to inform plaintiffs of their rights and refer E.J. for an
evaluation, conducted a limited evaluation of E.J., refused to
promptly develop an IEP for E.J., and failed to provide §504 services for eight months after the CST despite agreeing that E.J. qualified for such services-were sufficient to allege statutory violations.
Id. at 500, 501. Specifically, the court rejected the defendants'
claim of immunity based on the IDEA mandate that the child remain in the current educational agency during the administrative
proceedings unless otherwise agreed upon by the parent and education agency, because the school failed to provide an IEP despite
the CST's conclusion that E.J. was eligible for special services and
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W.B.'s affirmative request. Id. at 500. Further, the court imputed a
requirement that the school identify and evaluate the disabled student within a reasonable period after being put on notice that the
child may suffer from a disability. Id. at 501. Consequently, the
court found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged a violation of
this duty and rejected plaintiffs' argument for qualified immunity.
Id. at 501, 502.
Turning to the plaintiffs' constitutional claims, Judge Sarokin
first analyzed the plaintiffs' due process argument. Id. at 502.
Judge Sarokin stated that the plaintiffs alleged the deprivation of a
right sufficient to implicate the due process clause. Id. The court
also noted that the plaintiffs were not challenging the constitutional adequacy of the procedures but rather alleged that the defendants violated due process by failing to follow the procedures.
Id. Finding that the procedural due process analysis regarding the
defendants' qualified immunity argument followed that of the
§1983 claims, the court reversed the district court's summary judgment for the reasons set forth above. Id. Additionally, the court
vacated the dismissal of the equal protection claim, as the claim
was not reached by the district court nor was it addressed on appeal. Id.
In addition, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of
the plaintiffs' claim of a conspiracy to deprive them of their civil
rights, finding no evidence to support the allegation. Id. at 503.
Finally, the court reinstated the plaintiffs' pendent state causes of
action having determined that the federal claims survived summary
judgment. Id.
With this decision, the Third Circuit for the first time approved a damages action for school officials' failure to properly
address a student's special education needs. Although the approval of damage suits in this area reinforces parents' and educators' adversarial perception of each other where they ideally should
be working together to serve the child's interests, perhaps the
threat of monetary damages will encourage school officials to address student's special education needs in a proper and timely
manner.
By announcing that a heightened standard applies to waivers
in settlement agreements, the Third Circuit has further sought to
protect the rights of children. Although the court did not reach
the public policy issue, Judge Sarokin's opinion suggests that a parent's waiver may be an affront to public policy because parents
often waive their rights while understandably anxious to corn-
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mence special education services in the face of resistant school officials. The heightened standard employed by the court better
protects the child's interests and educational development as well
as the parents and therefore, is nonetheless in accordance with
both the current state of the law and public policy.
Jennifer Hradil

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND DUE PROCESS-GRIEVANCE AND ARBITRATION PROCEDURES UNDER COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING
AGREEMENT
PRECLUDE COGNIZABLE

AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS UNDER 42
U.S.C. § 1983-Dykes v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Authority, 68
F.3d 1564 (3d Cir. 1995).
FOURTH

On July 13, 1993, Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority (SEPTA) supervisors boarded a SEPTA bus and requested that the driver submit to a body fluids drug and alcohol
test. 68 F.3d at 1565-66. The driver, Joseph G. Dykes, refused and
was consequently fired. Id. at 1566. Subsequently, Dyke's union,
the Transport Workers' Union of Philadelphia, AFL-CIO, Local
234 (Local 234), pursued three stages of grievance proceedings on
his behalf, wherein it was determined that the requested drug tests
were based upon reasonable suspicion. Dyke's discharge was upheld, and Local 234 did not submit the dispute to arbitration.
In September 1994, Dykes brought an action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against SEPTA and Local 234 for violations of his constitutional rights. Id. at 1565. Specifically, Dykes alleged that SEPTA
violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures when SEPTA ordered him to submit to
the testing without a reasonable suspicion that he was driving
under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Id. at 1566. In the second
count of his complaint, Dykes further alleged that SEPTA and Local 234 conspired to deprive him of a property interest in his employment by denying him the due process required by the
Fourteenth Amendment during the post-termination grievance
proceedings. Id.
Each defendant filed a motion to dismiss under FEDERAL RULE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b) (6). Id. Shortly thereafter, the district
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court granted the motions, dismissing the complaint in its entirety.
Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal, holding that under the collective bargaining
agreement, the issue of reasonable suspicion was a question of fact
to be resolved during the grievance/arbitration proceedings; that
the reviewing court was bound by such a determination; and that
where adequate grievance/arbitration procedures were available
and were followed, the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment were fully satisfied. Id. at 1565, 1568. In addition, the court concluded that because reasonable suspicion for
the testing was found at each stage of the grievance proceedings,
the requested search was reasonable and no cognizable claim
could be supported under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 1570.
Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Mansmann began by
enunciating the requisite standard of pleading for § 1983 actions:
A plaintiff must allege that the defendant deprived him of a right
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution and that the defendant did
so under color of state law. Id. at 1566. The panel concluded that
the sole issue presented for determination was the adequacy of
Dyke's complaint and proceeded to evaluate each count of his
complaint by this standard. Id.
Judge Mansmann commenced the court's analysis of the initial count of the complaint regarding Dyke's Fourth Amendment
claim by examining the collective bargaining agreement between
SEPTA and Local 234 in effect from 1992 to 1995. Id. The court
noted that pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement,
SEPTA was free to test its employees for drug and alcohol use
based upon an articulable, reasonable suspicion of such use exhibited by various indicative factors; it further provided that failure to
submit to such testing was a dischargeable offense. Id. at 1567 n.4.
Addressing the applicable Fourth Amendment precedent, the
court observed that although judicial interpretations of the Fourth
Amendment demonstrate that search and seizure issues may in fact
arise when public employees are tested for drugs, the Fourth
Amendment applies only when such searches and seizures are unreasonable. Id. at 1567 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Assoc., 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)). Reasonableness, the judge explained, depends upon the circumstances of the search or seizure
and involves a balancing of the intrusion upon the individual's
Fourth Amendment rights with the importance of the governmental interests asserted as justification for the intrusion. Id. The
court noted that the United States Supreme Court has recognized
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that individualized suspicion validates the reasonableness of a
search to an even greater extent when a legitimate state interest
exists in verifying the alleged violation. Id. (citing Skinner, 489 U.S.
at 623).
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Judge Mansmann
reasoned that because Dykes drove a transit bus, it was incontrovertible that SEPTA possessed a legitimate interest in its drug and
alcohol testing program. Id. The court recalled an earlier decision
in which the random drug testing of SEPTA employees was held
constitutional due to SEPTA's extensive substantiation of drug
abuse among its drivers. Id. (citing Transport Workers' Local 234 v.
SEPTA, 884 F.2d 709, 711 (3d Cir. 1988)). Thus, the panel explained, it was not SEPTA's drug and alcohol testing policy that
Dykes contended was unconstitutional; rather by ordering that
Dykes submit to the test without reasonable suspicion, SEPTA violated its own policy, thereby rendering the proposed search unreasonable and, as a result, unconstitutional. Id. at 1568.
Accordingly, the court's focus narrowed to the issue of
whether SEPTA had reasonable suspicion to test Dykes for drug
and alcohol use. Id. In so doing, the court relied heavily on the
Third Circuit's decision in Bolden v. SEPTA, which concluded that
the question of reasonable suspicion is a factual determination to
be made during the grievance proceedings that is binding upon a
reviewing court. Id. (citing Bolden v. SEPTA, 953 F.2d 807 (3d Cir.
1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 943 (1992)).
After embarking upon an extensive narration of the facts in
Bolden, Judge Mansmann recalled the Bolden court's pronouncement that a union such as that which represented Bolden (Local
234) may effectively consent to employment terms and conditions
such as drug testing, that implicate employees' constitutional
rights. Id. at 1569 (citing Bolden, 953 F.2d at 826). The court further recounted the Third Circuit's review of the federal judiciary's
recognition that, as exclusive bargaining agent, a union's authority
necessitates some limitations on constitutional rights otherwise enjoyed by individual employees. Id. (citing Bolden, 953 F.2d at 826).
Most significant to the court's analysis of Dyke's claim, the panel
noted, was Bolden's holding that certain factual determinations may
conclusively be made through collective bargaining and would be
precluded from further litigation, notwithstanding the fact that
such determinations could have significant implications under the
Fourth Amendment. Id. (citing Bolden, 953 F.2d at 828). In sum,
the judge pronounced, Bolden established that despite the uncon-
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stitutionality of a drug-testing policy, a public employee may not
engage in civil rights litigation based upon such unconstitutionality
where his union and employer have agreed to function under that
policy. Id. at 1570.
Applying Bolden to the issue presented, the court observed that
its principles governed the adjudication of Dyke's claim. Id. Judge
Mansmann opined that under the collective bargaining agreement
involved, all of the parties to the action should have realized that
the question of reasonable suspicion would be resolved during the
grievance proceedings. Id. Concluding that determinations of reasonable suspicion involve interpretations of the collective bargaining agreement through the grievance/arbitration process, the
panel announced that the judiciary must defer to these findings
unless the employee can demonstrate a breach of the union's duty
of fair representation. Id. (citation omitted). Inasmuch as reasonable suspicion for the testing was found at every stage of the grievance process, the court adjudged the proposed search reasonable
and upheld the district court's dismissal of Count I of Dyke's complaint. Id.
Turning to the second count of the complaint, the Third Circuit analyzed Dyke's allegations that Local 234 acted in concert
with SEPTA to deprive him of a property interest in his employment without due process of law. Id. Assuming arguendo that
Dykes had sufficiently alleged that his employment relationship
with SEPTA had created a property interest protectable by the
Fourteenth Amendment and that his discharge deprived him of
that interest, Judge Mansmann focused the court's analysis on the
issue of due process. Id. at 1570-71. The court stressed the fact
that Dykes had failed to pursue a claim for breach of the duty of
fair representation following Local 234's determination not to seek
arbitration after exhausting the grievance process. Id. at 1571.
The court instructed that although federal labor law governs
objections to the procedures utilized in the discharge of a public
employee, if that employee feels that the grievance process was deficient, relief is available under state law. Id. Moreover, the Third
Circuit recalled, existing grievance and arbitration proceedings
have been held to satisfy due process even if such proceedings were
inherently biased when conducted by the employer. Id. (citing
Jackson v. Temple Univ., 721 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1983)). The court
further observed that no authority had recognized a § 1983 action
for a union's refusal to arbitrate a public employee's claim against
his employer. Id. This was so, the court explained, because the
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union, as the exclusive bargaining representative, possessed the ultimate power to make a responsible decision as to whether it would
utilize arbitration pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement.
Id. Judge Mansmann also noted the Jackson court's acknowledgment that the right to arbitrate furnished essentially identical due
process safeguards as would have been provided in an unbiased
grievance proceeding. Id. (citing Jackson, 721 F.2d at 933 n.2).
The court next examined Armstrong v. Myers, a Ninth Circuit
decision that relied upon the Jackson opinion. Id. (citing Armstrong
v. Myers, 964 F.2d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 1992)). Armstrong, the court
recounted, upheld grievance/arbitration procedures as universally
accepted methods of employment dispute resolution that were
contained in innumerable collective bargaining agreements. Id. at
1572. Adopting the reasoning of Armstrong, the court concluded
that even when a discharged employee alleges that his employer
and union collude to deny him a meaningful hearing and arbitration, the grievance/arbitration proceedings contained in the collective bargaining agreement will satisfy due process. Id. Thus, the
panel proclaimed, because Dykes failed to petition the state court
to order arbitration available under the collective bargaining
agreement, Count II of his complaint was properly dismissed. Id.
The Third Circuit wisely deferred to the factual determinations of the grievance and arbitration proceedings available under
collective bargaining agreements. In so doing, the court preserved
the integrity of such agreements and has ensured that the public
employee union may fully perform its function as the exclusive bargaining agent of public employees. Judicial review of such findings
would not only seriously undermine the utility of collective bargaining agreements and the post-termination procedures established under them, but would also serve as a waste of judicial
resources. As the Ninth Circuit noted in Armstrong, the risk of an
erroneous determination during a grievance proceeding is slight.
Id. (citing Armstrong, 964 F.2d at 950). Moreover, arbitration,
whether voluntarily pursued by the union on the employee's behalf
or ordered by a state court at the employee's request, is still available to remedy any injustices and to satisfy due process concerns.
Keith J Rosenblatt

